Pavel Podvig | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

The fallacy of the Megatons to Megawatts program

Pavel Podvig — Wed, 23 Jul 2008 09:14:07 -0600

Few U.S.-Russian cooperation efforts are more popular and less controversial than the "Megatons to Megawatts" program, also known as the HEU-LEU deal, which converts Russia's highly enriched uranium (HEU) from nuclear weapons into low-enriched uranium (LEU) for U.S. nuclear power reactors. Under the agreement that the countries signed in 1993, Moscow made a commitment to eliminate 500 metric tons of HEU--probably more than one-third of the total HEU stock that the Soviet Union produced during the Cold War.

The push for a new arms control agreement with Russia is ill-conceived

Pavel Podvig — Tue, 03 Jun 2008 12:42:00 -0600

Skepticism about arms control agreements has been a prominent Bush administration position. As such, its arms control achievements are few and far between. But in its waning days, the administration has finally agreed with the long-standing Russian position that any new arms control agreement should be "legally binding." John McCain, the presumptive Republican nominee, also recently announced in a major speech on nuclear issues that he would seek a new arms control agreement with Russia.

Don't block U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation

Pavel Podvig — Thu, 22 May 2008 10:34:00 -0600

Two weeks ago, the United States and Russia signed an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, commonly known as a "123 agreement." It was immediately attacked from all sides. Some members of Congress urged the Bush administration not to submit the document to Congress and threatened to block it once they did. Meanwhile, nuclear skeptics in Russia raised concerns that the agreement could revitalize the idea of importing foreign spent nuclear fuel into Russia or strengthen the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. For their part, U.S.

The realities of nuclear fuel supply guarantees

Pavel Podvig — Fri, 18 Apr 2008 12:17:00 -0600

Virtually any discussion regarding the security implications of the spread of nuclear power involves the need to build a mechanism that would ensure a guaranteed, uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel for new nuclear power plants.

The U.S. satellite shootdown: An unnecessary action

Pavel Podvig — Thu, 28 Feb 2008 23:00:00 -0700

The intercept of the disabled USA-193 spy satellite the United States conducted on February 20 set a new benchmark for military exercises that have no benefits, but come at a tremendous political cost. The intercept topped even the U.S. decision to deploy missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic as an ill-advised maneuver that could only bring scores of suspicion and mistrust--exactly what the deployments inspired in Russia, where missile defense now poisons virtually every other issue in U.S.-Russian relations.

The truth about Russia's military "resurgence"

Pavel Podvig — Mon, 28 Jan 2008 23:00:00 -0700

Prideful talk of new missiles, submarines, and bombers actually reveals weak Russian leadership and a stubborn military-industrial complex that's preparing to fight yesterday's wars.

How Russia's nuclear fuel delivery to Iran benefits nonproliferation

Pavel Podvig — Wed, 19 Dec 2007 23:00:00 -0700

By supplying Iran with nuclear reactor fuel, Moscow might have taken an important step in preventing countries interested in nuclear power from enriching uranium indigenously.

U.S. nuclear weapons security--a "silly" notion

Pavel Podvig — Sun, 11 Nov 2007 23:00:00 -0700

At first glance, the U.S. military's response to the incident at Minot Air Base involving the transportation of six nuclear warheads across the United States was reasonably thorough and harsh--three colonel-rank commanders were relieved of their positions, the bomber wing at Minot was decertified from its wartime missions, and a number of air force personnel lost their certifications. More action will probably come in the next few months.

Russia and nuclear disarmament

Pavel Podvig — Tue, 16 Oct 2007 23:00:00 -0600

U.S. political leaders such as Barack Obama might be willing to discuss making a nuclear-weapon-free world a reality, but in Moscow, the tone is decidedly different.

U.S. loose nukes

Pavel Podvig — Wed, 12 Sep 2007 23:00:00 -0600

The idea that lax accounting, a violation of security procedures, and/or plain negligence could cause a warhead to disappear from a nuclear superpower's arsenal without notice was one of the scariest scenarios in the immediate post-Cold War period. More than a decade later, it turns out these concerns weren't unfounded. Such a scenario more or less occurred at the end of August. The only surprise was where it happened--not in Russia or one of the former Soviet republics as expected, but in the United States.

How to make U.S.-Russian relations meaningful

Pavel Podvig — Tue, 14 Aug 2007 23:00:00 -0600

Russia seems amenable to working with the United States on arms control. But for any measures to succeed, Washington needs to be a willing partner.

Why START is important

Pavel Podvig — Mon, 02 Jul 2007 23:00:00 -0600

The new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that Russia tested at the end of May probably sealed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty's (START) fate. The missile, named RS-24, appears to be a multiple-warhead version of the Topol-M ICBM that Russia has deployed for about a decade. A move toward a Topol-M with multiple warheads was all but inevitable, but not expected until START expires in December 2009.

The U.S. and Russia's "ludicrous" missile defense rhetoric

Pavel Podvig — Tue, 22 May 2007 23:00:00 -0600

Welcome to the latest version of the missile defense debate, which doesn't sound all that different from the superpower posturing of the Cold War.

Boris Yeltsin's arms control legacy

Pavel Podvig — Sun, 29 Apr 2007 23:00:00 -0600

Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first president, was never a cold warrior. Although he made his Soviet career in the Urals, the traditional stronghold of military-related heavy industry, his real background was in civilian construction. He ran the Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg) region in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a Communist Party boss, and although he was summoned to lead the Moscow party organization in December 1985, he hardly had an opportunity to involve himself in the details of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear superpower confrontation.

A U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperative?

Pavel Podvig — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 23:00:00 -0600

Oddly enough, the U.S.-Russian row over missile defense is exactly what needed to happen for the two countries to start talking again.

Behind Russia and Iran's nuclear reactor dispute

Pavel Podvig — Sun, 25 Mar 2007 23:00:00 -0600

Moscow has long helped Tehran with its nuclear power program, especially the reactor at Bushehr. So why the sudden change of heart?

Missile defense: The Russian reaction

Pavel Podvig — Sun, 25 Feb 2007 23:00:00 -0700

The row over U.S. intentions to deploy elements of its missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic has the potential of bringing U.S.-Russian relations--not to mention bilateral arms control--to a new low. Russia has disapproved of the scheme ever since the United States first went public with the system about two years ago. But despite sounding angry, Russia remained calm, arguing that it already possessed the technology to deal with the interceptors the United States planned to place in Eastern Europe.

Life after START

Pavel Podvig — Mon, 08 Jan 2007 23:00:00 -0700

With the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expiring in 2009, neither Russia nor the United States appear interested in further nuclear cuts.